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and (2) that the cost of the repairs itemized is usual and
customary. Finally, the bill must be served upon the adverse
party's attorney at least five days prior to the trial.
.ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Insurer's contractual obligation to defend and in-
demnify is a "debt" and capable of attachment.
CPLR 5201(a) provides that a money judgment can be
enforced against any debt, whether incurred within or without
the state or whether incurred by a resident or nonresident. There
is no express provision requiring that service of process be possible
on the party before the debt can be subject to enforcement, since
"jurisdiction over the judgment debtor or garnishee is an implicit
requirement for using any enforcement proceeding." 90
One area of litigation involving this section has been developing
a definition of the word "debt" in relation to the contractual
obligations of defendant insurance companies. 91  In Matter of
Riggle, 2 petitioner, a New York resident, was injured by decedent,
a resident of Illinois, in Wyoming. He moved to have an ad-
ministrator of Riggle's property appointed in New York. Basing
its decision on Section 47 of the Surrogate's Court Act,93 the
Court held that even though no judgment had been obtained against
Riggle or his estate, he was considered a creditor, and the insur-
ance carrier was held to be a debtor within the meaning of the
statute."
In Seider v. Roth,95 the plaintiffs, residents of New York,
were allegedly injured in an accident in Vermont through the
negligence of the defendant, a Canadian domiciliary. The defendant
was insured by a company doing business in New York, however,
the policy was issued in Canada. An order of attachment 8 directed
90 6 WEINSTEIx, KoRA & MiLLER, Naw YORK CIVIL PRAcricE ff 5201.04
(1965).
91 See also CPLR 6202, which provides that "any debt or property
against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in section
5201 is subject to attachment."
92 11 N.Y2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S2d 416 (1962).
93 This section provides that a debt owing to a defendant by a resident
of New York is regarded as personal property the situs of which is
within the county where the debtor resides.
94Although not confronted with similar jurisdictional problems since
the accident occurred in New York, another court has stated that a non-
resident insurer's "contractual obligation to defend and indemnify defendant
is a debt or cause of action capable of being attached . . . ." Fishman v.
Sanders, 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S2d 861 (2d Dep't 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965).
95 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).91 CPLR 6202.
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the sheriff to levy on the contractual obligation of the insurer
to defend and indemnify the defendant under the liability policy.
Since the insurer was doing business in New York, the attachment
papers were served on it within the state. It is significant to note
that the defendant was not served in New York, but was personally
served in Canada, and that the insurer was also a foreign
domiciliary.
In denying defendant's motion to vacate the attachment, the
majority stated that "as soon as the accident occurred there was
imposed on... [the insurer] a contractual obligation which should
be considered a 'debt' within the meaning of CPLR 5201 and
6202." 97 This statement by the Court appears to raise myriad
problems both theoretical and practical. The theoretical difficulties,
as noted by Judge Burke in his dissent, involve the classification
of these types of contractual obligations as a "debt." These obliga-
tions, called a debt by the majority, do "not fall within the definition
of attachable debt contained in CPLR 5201 (subd. [a]), i.e., one
which 'is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon
demand of the judgment debtor.' "9s This conclusion was reached
since the contract imposed the obligation to defend and indemnify
only "if a suit is commenced and if damages are awarded."99
In conclusion, the dissent noted that since jurisdiction was obtained
only by attachment of the liability policy, this, in effect, was
allowing a "direct action" against the foreign insurer under the
pretext of in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist.
Although the theoretical problems exist, it appears that the
practitioner will be more interested in the practical difficulties which
will arise from this decision. For example, this action was one
involving in rem jurisdiction under CPLR 320(c),110 and the
defendant offered no defense on the merits. Having appealed
to the highest court, and having lost on the jurisdictional issue, the
defendant now may either defend on the merits or default in the
action. If he defaults, the judgment will have to be satisfied out of
the attached property. Therefore, a question must arise as to the
value of the attached property, viz., the insurer's obligation to
defend and indemnify. If the value of the obligation to indemnify
is held to be the face value of the policy, there will no longer be
any distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction.
This conclusion is mandated since New York will have extended
its jurisdiction extraterritorially without having a recognized basis
for doing so, since there is no "long-arm" statute applicable here,
97Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y2d 111, 113, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (1966).98 Id. at 115, 216 N.E2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (dissenting opinion).
go Ibid.
200 This provides that the defendant may make a special appearance
to contest the jurisdiction of the court.
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and since the "long-arm" basis is the furthest the United States
Supreme Court has gone in sustaining the extraterritoriality of
state court process.
Assuming that the aforementioned difficulties were -.resolved
by equating in rem and in personam jurisdiction, another problem
now arises. Since New York courts must entertain a suit brought
by one of its residents,10 1 the litigation resulting from this decision
could add to our already overburdened calendars. Previously, a
resident could not sue a foreign domiciliary in New York if he
had no jurisdiction over the latter; however, as a result of this
case, our courts would give the plaintiff jurisdiction of the de-
fendant, since many foreign insurers have sufficient presence in
New York to make them garnishees in a New York action.
CPLR 5206(b): Amendment.
The amendment to this section rectifies an inaccuracy which
had heretofore existed. Instead of recording the property exempted
as a homestead in the county clerk's office, the section is now
worded so that such recording is done in the office of the
recording officer. This clause was necessitated by the fact that
in some counties the office of the county clerk is not the office
of the recording officer.
CPLR 5252: Amendment.
This section, effective January 1, 1967, protects an employee
from discharge when his employer has been served with an income
execution. However, if an employer is served with more than
one income execution within a twelve-month period, this section does
not apply and the employer can discharge his employee. An em-
ployee who is wrongfully discharged under this section is given
the opportunity to institute a civil action for wages lost if such
action is commenced within ninety days after the discharge. The
court, in addition to giving the employee damages, can also order
his reinstatement.
For a more detailed discussion of this amendment, see Professor
David D. Siegel's 1966 Comnentary in, McKinney's CPLR.
ARTicr.E 55- APA. ,s GENMZALLY
CPLR 5520(c): Amendment.
Due to an increasing number -of appepls wherein -there are
defective notices of appeal and motions directed thereto, the Judicial
101 See Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 App. Div. 2d. 564, 173 N.Y.S2d 525
(1st Dep't 1958).
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